Regulatory Governance Under Pressure

The Section ‘Regulatory Governance Under Pressure’ brings together panels and papers that focus on regulatory governance in a changing world. By regulatory governance, we mean the use of rules – including standard-setting, monitoring and sanctioning – to intervene in the activities of specific categories of economic, political or social actors (e.g., Jordana et al., 2018; Koop and Lodge, 2017). Such interventions may be the initiative of governments and national-level regulatory agencies, but they may also take the form of self-regulation by industry and regulation by international organisations, and transnational regulators (Black, 2017; Drahos, 2017). The scope of regulatory governance has expanded considerably over the past decades – at all levels of governance and both within and outside the state (Knill et al., 2012), increasing also the level of intertwinement of regulatory agencies at all level (Bach and Ruffing, 2018; Busuioc 2016). Yet, partially as a consequence of this expansion, regulatory governance is increasingly challenged (Black, 2017). Pressures on regulatory governance come in a number of forms. First, crises in various areas of regulation have raised questions about the effectiveness of current models of regulation. This is particularly – but by no means exclusively – the case in the field of financial market supervision, where the global financial and European debt crises have exposed regulatory failures and deficiencies at the national, supranational and international level (Ferran et al., 2012). Second, as many regulatory competences are exercised by independent regulatory bodies, questions and critique have been expressed of alleged democratic deficits in the regulatory state (e.g., Groenleer, 2014; Maggetti 2010; Majone, 1999). With the expansion of regulatory governance, and the increased visibility of failures and crises, critics of this aspect of the regulatory state have also become more vocal (Börzel, 2016). Third, the ability of regulatory governance to tackle emerging challenges has been questioned. Societal issues associated with technological change and the mobility of companies in a globalised world have led to calls for more regulation (Büthe and Mattli 2013). At the same time, regulatory ‘solutions’ that have emerged so far are themselves subject to considerable criticism. Fourth, the expansion of business regulation has also resulted in increased interest in the influence of the regulatory sector on the shape and contents of regulation, including questions of co-regulation, business lobbying, revolving doors and capture (e.g., Carpenter and Moss, 2013; Arras and Braun 2018). These questions have become more salient in a period in which populist parties and leaders are increasingly successful, challenging the role and motives of politicians as well as regulators. This Section seeks to address the causes and consequences of the different pressures on regulatory governance, and invites panels and papers that centre on any of the contemporary pressures on this mode of governance. Literature cited Arras, Sarah and Caelesta Braun 2018. Stakeholders Wanted! Why and How European Union Agencies Involve Non-State Stakeholders. Journal of European Public Policy 25 (9): 1257-1275. Bach, Tobias and Ruffing, Eva 2018. The Transformative Effects of Transnational Administrative Coordination in the European Multi-level System. In Edoardo Ongaro and Sandra van Thiel (Eds). The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe (747-763). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Black, Julia 2017. Critical Reflections on Regulation. In Fiona Haines (Ed), Crime and Regulation (15-49). London: Routledge. Börzel, Tanja A. 2016. From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis of EU Governance: Regulatory Failure, Redistributive Conflict and Eurosceptic Publics. Journal of Common Market Studies 54: 8-31. Busuioc, Madalina 2016. Friend of foe? Inter-agency cooperation, organizational reputation, and turf. Public Administration 94 (1): 40-56. Carpenter, Daniel and Moss, David A. 2013. Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Drahos, Peter. 2017. Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications Acton. Canberra: ANU Press. Ferran, Eilis, Moloney, Niamh, Hill, Jennifer G. and Coffee, John C. 2012. The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Groenleer, Martijn. 2014. Agency Autonomy Actually: Managerial Strategies, Legitimacy, and the Early Development of the European Union's Agencies for Drug and Food Safety Regulation. International Public Management Journal 17: 255-292. Jordana, Jacint, Fernández‐i‐Marín, Xavier and Bianculli, Andrea C, 2018. Agency Proliferation and the Globalization of the Regulatory State: Introducing a Data Set on the Institutional Features of Regulatory Agencies. Regulation & Governance 12 (4): 524-540. Knill, Christoph, Schulze, Kai and Tosun, Jale, 2012. Regulatory Policy Outputs and Impacts: Exploring a Complex Relationship. Regulation & Governance 6:427-444. Koop, Christel and Lodge, Martin, 2017. What is Regulation? An Interdisciplinary Concept Analysis. Regulation & Governance 11:95-108. Maggetti, M. 2010. Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review. Living Reviews in Democracy 2:1–9. Majone, Giandomenico, 1999. The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems. West European Politics 22:1-24. Büthe, Tim and Walter Mattli 2013. The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ruffing, Eva 2017. Inside regulatory bureaucracy: When Europe hits home in pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Public Policy and Administration 32 (1): 3-23.