Kant, Active Citizenship and Epistocracy

Epistocratic (or rule-of-the-wisest) alternatives to electoral democracy have recently gained traction in the field of democratic theory, based on the claims that some citizens lack competency to vote well and that strict political inclusion thus produces undesirable results. Despite being a fierce defender of human dignity, freedom as self-governance and independence from the constraining choice of others, Immanuel Kant rejected universal turnout and displayed heavy criticism against democracy. This paper explores the idea that Kant’s restriction of the right to vote and his distinction between active and passive citizens are grounded on the epistocratic belief that some individuals are more apt to reason morally than others. To do so, I first offer a critical review of recent attempts to explain why Kant restricts the right to vote solely to citizens he perceived as self-sufficient. Second, I highlight the place of socialisation and development of capacities in Kant’s moral theory. I then propose an alternative reading of active citizenship based on moral competency. Third, I link this interpretation with Kant’s substantive conception of a legitimate political authority and his rejection of democratic ruling. I show how this interpretation of Kant's concerns can be situated among historical and modern arguments for epistocratic ruling. Fourth, I discuss its implications for contemporary epistemic debate regarding the value of democracy and political participation.