Ex ante analysis as policy therapy. A longitudinal perspective on the function of evidence in infrastructure policy processes.

Ex ante analysis are a peculiar type of knowledge. Take, for example, the analyses conducted in the infrastructure policy sector. These studies, predicting the environmental and economic impact of, for example, a highway expansion. They cost millions and often take multiple years to complete. Yet at the same time, existing research teaches us that the outcomes of these studies rarely surprise anyone, and are often used to support existing preferences rather than really determine process outcomes. We also know that policy makers are not naïve. They are aware of the complexities of policy making and are also the first ones to admit that often, knowledge does not play a linear role. Then why are these analyses so popular? Turning to the literature on knowledge use for an explanation of the popularity of studies provides a myriad of answers. For example, studies would be popular because they are a powerful political tool, because they fill knowledge gaps or because they offer a set of principles that allow actors to collaborate. This study shows how if one spends a longer time in a policy process, all these different uses can be observed, and most ex ante analyses can be used to support a wide array of different, sometimes even opposing positions. The common denominator is that within their specific context, all these different uses have a therapeutic effect. The paper describes how policymakers often can only make decisions based on intuition and experience-informed preferences, yet at the same time are expected to not let these factors, which are seen as ‘subjective’ weigh in on their decisions. Ex ante analyses give policy makers the confidence to act on their preferences by offering them seemingly neutral and ‘objective’ validation that they can also use to communicate their preferences to others in a convincing way. However, ex ante analyses exercise their therapeutic function at a price, which gives rise to concerns about the impact of ex ante analyses on democratic processes. The prominent presence of ex ante analyses moved people to replace their original arguments by arguments derived from ex ante analyses and responsibility for these arguments was transferred to the analyses. If people transfer the accountability for their actions to an inanimate object such as an ex ante analyses, how can they be held accountable, and up to what extend do they experience accountability after this transfer? In addition, how can decision-makers be held accountable when their reasons for taking a decision are replaced by analyses-approved reasons? And, lastly, is a policy processes in which individuals are not trusted as decision makers and need these kind of therapeutic devices a desirable kind of policy process?