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Regulating for evidence-based expert advice: which prescriptions for non-epistemic value judgments?

Governance
Public Policy
Knowledge
Normative Theory
Policy-Making
Cathrine Holst
Universitetet i Oslo
Cathrine Holst
Universitetet i Oslo

Abstract

Calls for expert advice are abundant in present-day governance, and regulators increasingly seek to regulate such advice in accordance with standards of ‘evidence-based policy-making’. Generally, evidence-based policy advice is to be based on ‘evidence’, and the definition of what constitutes proper evidence inevitably involves judgment on epistemic value, as some types of knowledge and methods will be preferred above others. Yet, the experts that are called upon in such policy advice are typically also involved in non-epistemic value considerations, for instance regarding the ethical and political assumptions of the research under review, and the ethical and political priorities of their principals or in the citizenry. Often, they will also be asked to prioritize and recommend policies when evidence is indeterminate or uncertain, or equally compatible with policies with different ethical and political underpinnings. How do regulations prepare for non-epistemic value judgments and policy choice among expert advisors, and which approach to such judgments are outlined? The paper will, first, map what regulatory documents and guidelines prescribe regarding ethical and political judgments in expert advice, zooming in on Norway, a country where the government increasingly asks experts to provide policy recommendations. Second, the paper will provide an assessment of the adequacy of these prescriptions, based on criteria derived from normative philosophical literatures on the proper political role of experts. It is argued that the prescriptions provided are in part rudimentary, in part flawed, and it is discussed how this can be, even in a sophisticated regulatory regime where expertise is held in high regard and expert advice plays a significant role. The paper connects normative philosophical argument with discussions of real-world policy-making and regulation, and has its focus on an understudied dimension of expert advice.