Party Competition in the EU Multilevel Electoral System: How Does Strategic Party Behaviour Impact on Parties’ Positions towards the EU?

Political parties take the same position towards the European Union (EU) in national and European elections. This finding is comprehensible and astonishing at once. Comprehensible because EP elections are widely known as second order national elections. Party positions should thus not vary to a strong degree over electoral levels. Astonishing because political parties are known as strategic actors adapting to the environment in order to achieve their vote-, office-, and policy-seeking goals. At least theoretically one could thus assume that different logics and incentive structures are at play at the different levels of the multilevel electoral system (MLES). The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the opposing incentive structures combining determinants of party positions towards the EU (such as party type and/or party ideology – mainstream vs. Eurosceptic party of the left vs. Eurosceptic party of the right; public opinion over Europe in a country; intra-party dissent over Europe; challenger parties in a country) with the theoretical framework on strategic party behaviour. Moreover, the role of the multiple crises the EU is currently subjected to will be integrated in this model as one additional event that is supposed to alter party competition in MLESs. The theoretical assumptions resulting from this exercise will be tested empirically using Euromanifesto and MARPOR data from 1979 to 2014 for all EU member states. Two divergent findings are conceivable: Either determinants do not differ over electoral level or different determinants are at play. Any of these findings will enable us to get a better understanding of how political parties adapt to a changing environment and behave strategically in order to attain their goals. This, in turn, is insightful for the literature on party behaviour as well as the current research on electoral democracy in MLESs such as the EU.