The Nature of Elite Beliefs: Exposure and Personal Biases

To act on behalf of those who elected them, politicians have to rely on beliefs about public will. Previous research has shown that elected officials often have distorted images of their constituents. However, it remains unclear why elites misperceive voters, and how these constraints can be overcome. I argue that misperceptions result from a combination of differential exposure and personal biases. Inequalities in political voice can generate distorted images of the electorate. However, imperfect information only tells part of the story. Personal biases of elected officials may also hinder the development of accurate beliefs. Representatives may be subject to false-consensus effects, whereby they overestimate support for positions they support. My arguments are tested in two studies: (1) a unique panel of Swedish MPs covering two decades on perceptions of voter preferences, and (2) an original survey of local elected officials in Switzerland. The first study provides observational evidence for the predictions derived from the theory. The second tests whether incentivizing political elites to avoid biases in perceptions of voter preferences induces more accurate beliefs about referendum results in their constituencies. Together, the results contribute to our understanding of democratic representation and provide guidance to political actors interested in bolstering the links between voters and their representatives.