EU Conditionality, the Backbone of Differentiation (and Challenges) of the Rule of Law within the EU Today

The paper seeks to examine two issues: firstly, how recent rule of law reforms within the EU are significant signs that its transformative powers have been limited with regard to the rule of law as part of EU Conditionality in its most recent member states. Secondly, the paper evaluates the effectiveness of recent rule of law frameworks developed and questions whether the starting point is the problem in the equation. It was been during the Accession Process that differentiation in conceptualisation of the rule of law was deemed acceptable, which has created differentiation not only in understandings of the rule of law within the EU today but of its application and development. It is acknowledged that the EU (vis-à-vis the Commission and the Parliament in particular), has been and continues to be a major player in rule of law reform and developments across member states (and prospective member states). However, questions have arisen since the 2004 enlargement, as to whether the EU, (the Commission in particular), has focused more on formal de jure rule of law reforms (e.g. judicial capacity) to the detriment of de facto rule of law (e.g. judicial independence and impartiality) developments. It is from this starting point, that particular EU member states have found issues of clientelism, state capture, corruption, and the political will of domestic actors, so challenging to the rule of law. These challenges have required in recent years, EU actors (the Commission and Parliament in particular), to create new Frameworks for the monitoring and assessment of the rule of law. Perhaps the fragmented approach EU governance on the rule of law has followed to-date, has led member states such as Poland and Hungary to their current stand-offs in terms of the rule of law?