Comparative Analysis of Formal Independence of Decentralised Agencies in the EU

Today, decentralised agencies are an established institutional feature in the multi-level system of the EU. In the early years of ‘agencification’, agency creation and independence, from legal and political perspectives, were the most urgent research questions. Although research on EU agencies has gone beyond these initial questions by focusing on day-to-day operations and accountability, agency independence remains an important topic, see e.g. the Court ruling regarding the powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to prohibit short-selling, illustrating that the Meroni doctrine is not a definitive answer, but that questions of independence and accountability are legally and politically contested. Against this backdrop, I analyse in this paper the formal independence of the 33 decentralised agencies in the EU. Research approach and method of analysis are based on set theory and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, by comparing the formal independence of all EU agencies (N=33), the paper adds to and extends on previous comparative research before the creation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) including ESMA, which is topical and relevant. Second, previous research comparing agency independence in comparative manner is based on correlational approaches employing regression analysis, i.e. testing the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable (formal independence). Given the complexities of ‘agencification’, I propose QCA as an alternative approach, thus assuming causal complexity with the aim to express variation of formal independence through statements on necessity and sufficiency. Applying QCA also offers the opportunity to critically discuss previous comparative research on agency independence in terms of operationalisation and measurement of variables. Third, mapping formal independence of all EU agencies with QCA facilitates case selection for subsequent case study analysis of agencies’ day-to-day operation in relation to formal independence and accountability.