Exploring the Revolving Door Phenomenon Across EU Interest Group Typologies

Interest groups (IGs) are widely regarded as fundamental component of the European Union (EU) political system. Because of the growing role of the EU as a policy-makers and the expansion of its regulatory power, EU institutions rely on IGs expertise to draft legislation and lobbying activities have become a prominent issue in the EU debate. One important characteristic of the lobbying activity and the relationship between public officials and IGs’ representatives is the revolving door (RD) practice: the movement of professionals from public offices to private sectors. Although the RD practice can be considered as a natural spinoff of the career path in the world of politics, it might raise normative concerns. Thus, it can be argued that former legislators, entering the sectors they have previously regulated, because of their insider knowledge, can guarantee to certain IGs privileged access to the decision- making process, unbalancing representation of interests. Thus, the central question of the study will be: to what extent the existence of the RD phenomenon is affecting the representation of interests in the EU, if at all? Taking an IGs prospective, this paper aims to explore (1) whether or not there are a substantial number of groups that experienced some form of RD, (2) which types of groups are more likely to experience the RD phenomenon, (3) which are the implications for how advocacy relations with policymakers are carried out. To conduct the empirical analysis, the investigation relies on comparative survey data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey Project (2016), which accounts for systematic mapping of the IGs population at EU-level. This paper aims to expand the IGs literature focusing on how occupational activities taken up by former EU public officials affect the representation of interests at EU-level.