The Parliamentarisation of EU Trade Policy: The Case of the EU-Japan Trade Negotiations

Since the Lisbon Treaty increased the legal role of the European Parliament (EP) in EU trade policy, there has been a debate about the extent to which these legal competencies have translated into actual influence over the content and outcome of EU trade negotiations, and whether they have constrained the room of maneuver of the Commission negotiators in DG Trade. Using a multi-level governance approach and analyzing the recently concluded trade negotiations between the EU and Japan – negotiations that were wholly prepared for and negotiated post Lisbon – this paper argues that the impact of the EP has indeed been significant, and that it has changed the inter-institutional dynamics between the Commission, the Council and the EP. The parliamentarization of trade policy has led to greater transparency both internally between the institutions, and externally vis-à-vis civil society organisations (CSOs). However, unlike the TTIP and CETA negotiations with the US and Canada respectively, there was limited mobilization of CSOs in the EU-Japan negotiations. This allowed the EU negotiators and their Japanese counterparts to speed up the conclusion of the negotiations and demonstrate their full commitment to free trade and closer regulatory cooperation following the election of President Trump and Brexit, without worrying about public domestic opposition. And given its close liaisons with the EP throughout the negotiation process, the Commission negotiators do not worry about a parliamentary ratification failure. The paper contributes to the general literature on EU trade negotiations, and to the EU-Japan agreement specifically – an agreement that so far has received little scholarly attention, and which has been identified as a possible template for the future EU-UK post-Brexit free trade agreement.