Intergovernmentalisms and Fiscal Governance of the European Union: Explaining Tightening, Pooling and Delegation

New intergovermentalism contends that new core state policies should be characterized by less pooling and delegation, especially during the recent crisis. We contrast these expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and delegation theory, and we subject them to empirical corroboration by means of a systematic provision-by-provision analysis of the patterns of tightening, pooling and delegation of the European Union fiscal governance rules adopted between 1993 and 2013. We also investigate governmental and institutional positions over these issues. We find evidence of a bias against delegation and tightening, despite noncompliance, in the initial design of fiscal governance and its 2005 reform, for which we offer an explanation based on policy uncertainty, bargaining context and procedural hurdles. The recent tightening of national obligations and shift from pooling to delegation instead run counter to new intergovernmentalist expectations. These outcomes can be explained by established theories.