The EU Commission and Brexit: ’New’ Institutional Leadership?

The decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU), following its 2016 referendum, left the remaining 27 EU member states with a dilemma: how would the terms of its exit be negotiated? The issue in question obviously touched the highest political level in terms of impact, but the nitty-gritty of the negotiations required considerable technocratic expertise. There was only one real institutional option for the EU: designate the European Commission, with a specially-appointed political heavyweight Chair – such as the former French Foreign Minister and EU Commissioner, Michel Barnier – to lead in the negotiations. Once a series of (tentative) deals were in place – initially on the UK’s ‘divorce bill’, the rights of EU citizen-residents in the UK and the Irish border; then on the UK’s trading relationship with the EU – they could be scrutinised and then politically accepted or rejected by EU member governments and the European Parliament. But was this negotiation formula really inevitable? Or does it signify a new form of supranational entrepreneurship by the Commission, with effects that are potentially transformative, thus significantly changing established patterns of leadership in the EU? This paper – based on on-the-ground fieldwork in Brussels in early 2018 – will investigate these questions and (probably) end up concluding that: 1) the Commission’s privileged role stems mostly from its close collaboration with EU member states via the European Council, and trusted relations between EU Heads of State and Government and the Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, as the most experienced participant in the European Council by far; and 2) whether the Commission becomes a more significant source of leadership in the EU depends on political developments well beyond its own control.