The Role of the European Parliament in UN Climate Negotiations: Does Ex Post Veto Power Affect the EP’s Climate Diplomacy?

The European Parliament (EP) has had historically limited power in the context of international climate diplomacy. However, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EP has gained the right to veto the EU’s ratification of legally binding international agreements, including UN climate agreements. This begs the question as to whether the increased formal involvement of the EP in the ratification of climate agreements has led to any change in the behaviour of the EP in international climate negotiations. This paper addresses this question through analysing whether the EP’s ex post veto power on the ratification of legally binding climate treaties affects its involvement before (ex ante) and during (ad locum) the annual Conference of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Before the COP negotiations, the EP usually adopts a resolution signalling its preference on the future COP outcome. During the COPs, a delegation of the EP attends the negotiations and conducts parliamentary diplomacy. Distinguishing between COPs with and without a legally binding outcome, the paper hypothesizes that the EP’s resolutions are less radical and that the members of the EP who attend international climate negotiations are more strongly involved when these negotiations result in a legally binding outcome. Based on systematic analysis of EP resolutions and summary notes of the EP delegation, the paper finds that contrary to expectations the EP’s ex post veto power does not affect the EP’s climate diplomacy. It is suggested that the reason for this counter-intuitive finding is that the EP has successfully institutionalized its established modus operandi during multilateral climate negotiations, irrespective of the outcome.