Regulation, interest groups and revolving doors

Abstract

Regulators rely on information and expertise provided by interest groups, including, particularly, the regulated industry. Moreover, they bring in expertise via the appointment of board members and other officials with professional experience in the sector they regulate. How does this affect regulation and regulatory independence? Under what conditions is the regulated industry able to shape regulatory policies and decisions? What mechanisms are put in place to mitigate the risk of capture, and how effective are these? This panel seeks to bring together contributions that offer insight into these questions.

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