ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Promoting Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption via EU Post-Accession Conditionality: The Case of Romania

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Democracy
Governance
Corruption
Ingi Iusmen
University of Southampton
Ingi Iusmen
University of Southampton

Abstract

The EU has advanced the rule of law and anti-corruption reform in Romania since 2007. By using the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), the EU has established benchmarks to monitor and assess progress in key areas, such as judicial reform and fight against corruption. However, recently the Romanian started to undo the judicial and anti-corruption reforms. This was particularly the case in January and December 2017, when the Romanian Parliament adopted legislation that weakened the independence of the judiciary and anti-corruption reform. This paper examines how and the extent to which supranational mechanisms, such as the CVM, have been effective in advancing democratic standards and principles in Romania, as evidenced by the CVM objectives, namely rule of law and fight against corruption. By drawing on the recent empirical developments in Romania, it is argued that the supranational instruments, such as the CVM, and the external monitoring of rule of law and fight against corruption fail to target the socially and culturally entrenched norms and attitudes that perpetuate anti-democratic practices. While institutionally and legally, the CVM monitoring and evaluations have produced some positive effects, as reflected in the wide range of reform measures and convictions handed down, the more socially and culturally entrenched practices, such as bribery and clientelism, continued to be part and parcel of how national authorities and communities operate. Yet addressing these embedded ‘modus operandi’ practices by the EU at the domestic level raises crucial questions about the role and mandate of supranational bodies, such as the EU, in interfering and advancing specific templates of rule of law and fight against corruption. The EU faces a political dilemma: namely to what extent addressing socio-culturally entrenched undemocratic practices at the national is the responsibility of national governments or of supranational institutions.