The EU in Disequilibrium – From the Euro Crisis to a Crisis of Integration

The new intergovernmentalism as a theoretical framework for understanding post-Maastricht integration in the European Union (EU) seeks to makes sense of an integration paradox. Europe’s mainstream political elites remained committed to pressing on with more integration while being increasingly concerned about popular support for the integration project. One line of explanation for this paradox suggests that normative concerns over representation, legitimacy and the organization and articulation of interests shape institutional choices in the EU alongside conflicts over socio-economic interests. This paper develops this hypothesis further by examining the democratic deficit as a driver of institutional design in the post-Maastricht period, with specific reference to the euro crisis and other on-going crises. It argues that the post-Maastricht diagnosis of the Union’s democratic deficit affected in particular the EU’s foundational norms of democracy, sovereignty, rule of law and fundamental rights. Notably, important institutional reforms revealed contradictions and reinforced tensions between these foundational principles. The reinforced role of member state governments as ultimate decision-makers in EU policy-making gradually undermined the rule of law principle as EU law was perceived as limiting national democracy and sovereignty. In a similar vein, original conceptions of EU law by supranational elites as a historical device for integration, had brushed aside conflicts with member state traditions and practices, as EU law was portrayed as being per se legitimate because it advanced the European cause. The paper discusses EU institutional reform in the context of the euro crisis and other major contemporary policy challenges, as providing evidence for these tensions.